In a recent article published on the WLBT3 website entitled, “Amanda Knox calls for ban on police lying to suspects during interrogation”, the authors describe several false confession cases in which they report that the investigators lied to the suspect about the evidence in the case....taking the position that lying about evidence causes false confessions.

What the authors fail to point out is that in case after case it is not the misrepresentation of evidence that causes false confessions, it is the 'aggravating circumstances" involved in the interrogation. For example, in the Amanda Knox case she was interrogated for 53 hours over a 5 day period, stripped naked and verbally abused.

For perspective, in 1969 the United States Supreme Court upheld the use of misrepresenting evidence to the subject. The case was Frazier v. Cupp (394 U.S. 731). In that case, the Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of the defendant’s confession, which, in part, was the result of the police falsely telling the subject that his accomplice had confessed. The Court held that the misrepresentations were relevant, but that they did not make an otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible. In reaching this conclusion, the Court judged the materiality of the misrepresentation by viewing the “the totality of circumstances.”

It is important to highlight the Court’s reference to an “otherwise voluntary confession,” the clear implication being that if the subject’s rights were honored; if there were no threats of harm or inevitable consequences; if there were no promises of leniency; and if the investigator followed the guidelines established by the courts, then misrepresenting evidence, in and of itself, will not jeopardize the admissibility of the confession.

This same thought has been reiterated in several cases and studies. In State v. Kolts (205 A.3d 504) the Supreme Court of Vermont upheld the defendant’s confession that was made in response to the detective’s false claim that there was DNA evidence to prove his guilt. From the Court’s opinion:

The detective's false claim of DNA evidence is not enough to render his confession involuntary without other coercive actions, such as a promise of leniency. But the detectives here made defendant no promises of leniency. And, as courts have reasoned, an interviewer's use of false evidence is less likely to produce an involuntary confession than an interviewer's lie about matters external to the charge. For example, lies threatening a suspect's ability to retain custody of a child render a confession involuntary because they could induce a confession by overcoming a suspect's will. But lies about evidence of the charge are more likely to evoke, if any feelings at all, a suspect's beliefs about his or her own culpability.

In Anderson v. Vannoy, (WL 2077126) the US District Court upheld the lower court’s decision not to suppress the defendant’s incriminating statements:

Regarding certain falsehoods used by the police during questioning, the issue is whether or not such tactics were sufficient to make an otherwise voluntary confession or statement inadmissible. In Lockhart, a detective misled the defendant into believing that the police knew more about the case than they really did by telling him that the victims had identified him…This court found that the detectives’ statements to the defendant were not sufficient inducements “to make an otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible.”

In Commonwealth v. Gallett (481 Mass. 662 ) the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the admissibility of the defendant’s confession:

Gallett argues that the interrogating officers misrepresented evidence that strengthened their case and made false assurances that ultimately induced Gallett into making inculpatory statements. We conclude that the officers did not act impermissibly. We have suppressed a defendant's statements in circumstances where police use trickery or a ruse in obtaining a confession. Those cases generally have additional circumstances -- apart from the ruse itself -- that rendered the confession involuntary. The Court pointed out that these additional circumstances included “coercive tactics relating to defendant’s son”; minimizing “the legal gravity of the alleged crime”; suggesting to the defendant that “if he did not confess, he would be charged with more serious crimes”; after defendant invoked his right to counsel, “dissuaded defendant from consulting with lawyer”; and, “implicitly promised leniency as well as alcohol counseling if defendant confessed”.

In State v. Johnson ( WL 627063) the Court of Appeals of South Carolina upheld the voluntariness of the defendant’s confession, indicating the misrepresenting evidence is not a coercive tactic:

"Misrepresentations of evidence by police, although a relevant factor, do not render an otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible.”… “Both this [c]ourt and the United States Supreme Court have recognized that misrepresentations of evidence by police, although a relevant factor, do not render an otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible .... The pertinent inquiry is, as always, whether the defendant's will was ‘overborne.’"

Consider the court’s opinion in US v. Graham (2014 WL 2922388 (N.D.Ga.)) in which the court pointed out that misrepresenting evidence is “one factor to consider among the totality of the circumstances in determining voluntariness.” The court points out that there are a number of cases in which statements elicited from a defendant in response to police deception were found involuntary… but the court stated, "these cases all involve significant aggravating circumstances not present here, such as, subjecting the accused to an exhaustingly long interrogation, the application of physical force or the threat to do so, or the making of a promise that induces a confession.”

There is a consistent consensus of opinion by the courts that lying about evidence in an “otherwise voluntary confession,” will not render a confession inadmissible. It is the view of the courts that behaviors such as threats of harm or inevitable consequences, denial of rights, promises of leniency or other such coercive behaviors will jeopardize the admissibility of the subject’s confession.

According to false confession experts, oftentimes social psychologists, there are two sources of research that support their belief that misrepresenting evidence causes false confessions. “First, studies of actual cases reveal that the false evidence ploy….. is found in numerous wrongful convictions in the U.S., including DNA exonerations.” (Saul Kassin, et al, “Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations” Law Hum Behav (2010) 34:3–38). In his 2011 book, Convicting the Innocent, Brandon Garrett, a law professor at the University of Virginia, examined most of the case files for the first 250 DNA exonerations, which included 40 false confession cases, several of which included lying to the subject about the case evidence. However, as pointed out by Dr. Deborah Davis and Dr. Richard Leo, “Many, and perhaps most, of the interrogations in the cases Garrett reviewed crossed the line of proper interrogation technique through the use of explicit threats and promises, feeding suspects crime facts, and/or other coercive practices.”

In another research effort, the author studied the first 110 DNA exoneration cases reported by the Innocence Project. The author reported that “This study failed to find a single false confession of a cognitively normal individual that did not include the use of coercive tactics by the interrogator…” The author identified coercive interrogation tactics as “the use of physical force; denial of food, sleep or bathroom; explicit threats of punishment; explicit promises of leniency; and extremely lengthy interrogations.” (J. Pete Blair, “A Test of the Unusual False Confession Perspective: Using Cases of Proven False Confessions” Criminal Law Bulletin (Vol 41, Number 2)

The authors were provided with much of this information but failed to include it in their story - it did not fit their narrative.