Here are three new cases that illustrate the value of recording an interrogation so that the court can effectively evaluate the claims made by a defendant on appeal:

In State v. Blackwell, the Louisiana Court of Appeal found that:

"After reviewing the record, we find no error in the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress his confession. Based upon Detective Brown's testimony and the detailed confession itself, we conclude that defendant's confession was freely and voluntarily made. The record and the evidence, particularly the videotaped statement, (emphasis added) reveal that the thrust of comments and questions by the detectives during the defendant's statement was that defendant would have an easier time if he told the truth. Rather than promises or inducements designed to extract a confession, these comments were "more likely musings not much beyond what this defendant might well have concluded for himself."

"Therefore, we find the detectives' comments do not constitute illegal inducements sufficient to render defendant's confession involuntary. It is well settled that suggestions that a defendant would be better off by cooperating are not "promises or inducements designed to extract a confession." Additionally, a confession is not rendered inadmissible because officers "exhort or adjure" an accused to tell the truth, provided the exhortation is not accompanied by an inducement in the nature of a threat or which implies a promise of reward."

"Although the detectives repeatedly advised the defendant that he could receive psychological help and/or treatment if he showed remorse for the offenses, they did not, in any way, promise or lead the defendant to believe that he would not be prosecuted and incarcerated for the crimes. Instead, the detectives merely advised the defendant that psychological help would be available to him and that they would even recommend he receive the help if he so desired. A statement by a law enforcement officer, prior to a confession, that cooperation would be communicated to possible prosecuting authorities, is not a sufficient inducement to render a subsequent confession inadmissible." Click here for the complete decision.

In the case of Smith v. Texas, the Texas Court of Appeals when examining the issue of whether the defendant mad an unambiguous request to terminate the interrogation, found that:

"Here, after a careful review of the videotaped statement, we agree with the State that appellant did not say, "I just want to end this and get something to eat because I'm hungry," or, "I'm going to stop this and go upstairs and get something to eat," but rather appellant stated, "Man. Whatever's gonna happen, cause I'm just ready to go up there and eat," and, "Could I go upstairs because I'm hungry?" Neither of these statements constitutes an unambiguous invocation of his right to end the interview. The statements indicate only that appellant was hungry and wanted to eat, not that he wanted to end the interrogation. We conclude, therefore, that appellant did not unambiguously invoke his right to end the interview, and Officer Anderson did not violate appellant's rights when she continued to question him. Click here for the complete decision.

In the case Hudson v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Kentucky examined this issue of what constituter's an implied promise of leniency and found that:

"Regarding the "implied promises of leniency," Detective Shearer testified at the suppression hearing that neither he nor Detective Schoonover made any promises as to the crime with which Hudson would be charged, the sentence he would ultimately receive, or any leniency he might receive in the court system. And Hudson fails to identify any promise made-except for vague promises to get him help and to inform superiors in the police department and the Commonwealth's Attorney's office of his cooperation-or any threat made-except for a vague threat that the detectives would not accept a plea agreement if he did not confess. Naturally, the detectives were not ultimately responsible for whether Hudson received a favorable plea offer. But the record also shows attempts by the detectives to clarify for Hudson that the court system, not they, would determine the outcome of the case.

In essence, Hudson points to no explicit promises of lenient treatment for his confession. He does point to the detectives mentioning in the interview several examples of killers being charged with crimes less than murder or being treated psychiatrically without being convicted. Apparently, as a result of hearing these examples, he alleges he "understood the police to tell him that if he confessed to the crime, he would be evaluated and most likely charged with manslaughter rather than murder." Even if the detective's discussion of these examples led Hudson to believe that he would be more likely to receive a lesser charge or sentence if he confessed, this did not render his statement involuntary" Click here for the complete decision